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I 
INTRODUCTION 
From the time of the Roman emperor Justinian in the sixth century, 
when usufructuary rights were constrained by a prohibition on 
“poison[ing] the atmosphere,”1 understanding the limits posed by our 
use of the natural environment has been a critical component of the 
regulation of our social life. Now, moving into the twenty-first 
century, climate change poses possibly the largest environmental 
policy challenge in human history. The debate concerning this 
complicated and novel issue has been hotly contested, but largely 
fruitless, since the initial formal acknowledgment of the climate 
problem at Rio in 1992.2 
In the United States, the climate policy debate has been an 
extraordinarily unproductive partisan affair, despite the enormous 
implications for the health of the planet and future generations of 
human beings.3 Political leaders cannot even reach consensus on the 
existence of the climate change threat,4 let alone agree on who ought 
to have jurisdictional control or which tool we ought to use to address 
the problem. Much of the discussion in recent years has focused on 
the stated goal of “sustainable development” among the majority of 
those who have accepted the prevailing science.5 
	
1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, Vol. 2, Book VII, 10 (CHARLES HENRY MONRO, trans., 
Cambridge 1909). The original Latin reads, “aut caelum corrumpant agri” literally 
translating to “corrupt the air of the farm.” Id. 
2 See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849, available at unfccc.int 
/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (imposing international cooperative obligations on the 
signatory parties in response to climate change) [hereinafter United Nations]. 
3 See Riley E. Dunlap & Aaron M. McCright, A Widening Gap: Republican and 
Democratic Views on Climate Change, ENVIRONMENT (Sept. 2008), http://www 
.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/September-October%202008/dunlap 
-full.html. 
4 See Sahil Kapur, GOP to Investigate ‘Scientific Fraud’ of Global Warming: Report, 
THE RAW STORY (Nov. 2010), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2010/11/gop-investigate          
-scientific-fraud-global-warming-report/ (reporting that “Ninety-seven percent of climate 
scientists—and just about every accredited international scientific institution in the 
world—unequivocally agree that global warming is occurring and is fueled by human 
activity,” but that the GOP-controlled house of representatives will hold hearings probing 
the “scientific fraud” of global warming). 
5 United Nations, supra note 2, at 5. 
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Unfortunately, “sustainability” as a broad-based policy standard or 
legal doctrine has no widely accepted definition.6 Most perceive it as 
a relatively modern concept, dating it to the oft-cited United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution of 1987.7 That definition’s vagueness 
and modernity has invited constant criticism and reworking from 
various perspectives.8 This article will use the legal lens of the waste 
doctrine to illuminate the differences and inform the choice between 
two prominent conceptions of sustainability—referred to in the 
discipline as “weak” sustainability and “strong” sustainability. 
The goal of this article is to provide a new framework for 
analyzing sustainability, and climate policy in general, through the 
use of an old framework: the property law waste doctrine. Although 
numerous scholars have scrutinized the legal implications of climate 
change in tort, especially public nuisance, none yet have attempted to 
ground a legal obligation of sustainability in the traditional property 
law concept of waste. Premising the climate change policy decision 
on an old, non-contentious doctrine will perhaps cut through the 
partisan bickering surrounding the policy debate and the use of tort 
law in the climate change context.9 
The doctrine of waste in Anglo-American property law has long 
been a vehicle for those with an interest in the future to restrict 
resource-depleting activities in the present,10 serving as the 
manifestation of sustainability as a concrete legal obligation. Put 
	
6 See W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Discounting for Regulatory Analysis, 74 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 209, 236 (claiming sustainability is an “ill-defined environmentalist battle cry”). 
Admittedly “sustained yield” standards have been promulgated in the regulation of very 
specific industries, for example forestry on Bureau of Land Management lands in the 
Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960, but such standards have little or no application 
beyond the targeted resource. Multiple Use-Sustainable Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 
528–31. 
7 G.A. Res. 42/187, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/187 (Dec. 11, 1987) (“meeting the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs”). 
8 See Andrew D. Basiago, Methods of Defining ‘Sustainability,’ 3 SUSTAINABLE DEV. 
109, 111 (1995) (noting that varying definitions of sustainability have evolved to suit 
various disciplines, such as biology, economics, sociology, urban planning, and ethics); 
see, e.g., DAVID A. MUNRO ET. AL., CARING FOR THE EARTH: A STRATEGY FOR 
SUSTAINABLE LIVING, 10 (1991) (defining sustainability as “improving the quality of 
human life while living within the carrying capacity of supporting eco-systems”). 
9 Cf. Eduardo M. Peñalver, Acts of God or Toxic Torts? Applying Tort Principles to the 
Problem of Climate Change, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563 (1998) (arguing that an analysis 
of global warming based on the model of tort liability can contribute to the policy debate). 
10 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 73 (6th ed. 2003). 
MOFFA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2013  10:28 AM 
462 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 27, 459 
another way, the doctrine of waste protects future interest holders 
from detrimental acts of present interest holders. Specifically, the 
doctrine of waste governs the competing interests of life tenants and 
remaindermen, attempting to incentivize the life tenant to not exploit 
the natural resources exclusively for his own present benefit and leave 
the future interest worthless.11 This core concept should help to 
determine the nature of the current generation’s obligations as holder 
of the present interest in the earth’s resources. 
Part II will survey the discourse concerning equitable obligations to 
future generations in moral philosophy as it interacts with the waste 
doctrine and contemporary notions of sustainability. 
Part III will examine in depth the doctrine of waste, analyzing its 
roots and establishing its relevant connection to the current 
environmental crisis. The doctrine of waste has a long and rich history 
in the common law systems of the United States and England.12 
Studying the birth and evolution of the doctrine will help shed light 
on how its core purpose aligns with sustainability as an obligation to 
future generations. 
Part IV will connect the historical with the contemporary, aligning 
the tests applied by common law courts in the United States and 
England hundreds of years ago with the competing approaches to 
sustainability that could provide the basis for policy in the near future. 
Part V will bring the final piece of analysis by drawing on the 
judicial determination of appropriate remedy in the waste context to 
provide unbiased and reasoned guidance for decision-making of 
policymakers confronting the climate change problem. This Part will 
suggest how trends in the former can help to break the partisan 
gridlock currently holding up the latter, providing a useful practical 
application of the theories espoused herein. 
II 
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 
The underlying moral philosophy concerning intergenerational 
resource allocation provides the ethical foundation for both the legal 
obligations of the waste doctrine and modern sustainability theories.13 
	
11 Id. 
12 See generally, Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A 
Pluralist Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653 (2005–2006). 
13 See Maite Cabeza Gutés, The Concept of Weak Sustainability, 17 ECOLOGICAL 
ECON. 147, 150 (1996) (noting that “the concept of sustainability arose from a much  
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The philosophical discussion concerning intergenerational equity has 
existed for literally thousands of years, preceding by many 
generations the development of the waste doctrine and any notion of 
sustainability. 
A. Sustainability as a Problem of Equity 
The starting point for modern policy formation must be the ethical 
roots of sustainability, which establish obligations toward future 
generations and presuppose some type of intergenerational equity.14 
At the core of the policy debate is a theoretical disagreement over the 
extent, and perhaps even the existence, of intergenerational 
obligations. 
Bald economic conceptions of sustainability, based on the growth 
theory, express intergenerational equity as nothing more than a 
constant stream of consumption per capita for an infinite amount of 
time.15 Perhaps the founding father of this line of thinking, Robert 
Solow, advanced a model that was premised on finding an 
intertemporally efficient allocation of environmental resources 
through price corrections based on individual preference values.16 
This view acknowledges some obligation not to deplete total capital 
stock, but makes no generation accountable for the depletion of 
specific resources and entitles no future generation to those resources. 
The issue is less about equity and more about best business practices, 
ensuring a constant stream of non-declining returns. 
Some economists have strayed from this standard position and 
argued that sustainability is more a matter of ethical, rather than 
fiscal, obligations. These critics assert that the obligation to act 
sustainably does indeed flow from rights of future generations as well 
	
broader concern about the conflicts between economic activity and the environment, with 
special emphasis on inter- and intra-generational equity.”); see also EDITH BROWN WEISS, 
IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 21 (1989) (suggesting that each generation is both 
a custodian and user of common planetary resources, and flowing from that custodial role 
are certain moral obligations that can translate into legally enforceable norms). 
14 Konrad Ott, The Case for Strong Sustainability, in GREIFSWALD’S ENVIRONMENTAL 
ETHICS at 59, 60 (Konrad Ott & Philipp Pratap Thapa eds., 2003). 
15 Gutés, supra note 13, at 149. 
16 See Robert Solow, Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources, REV. ECON. 
STUD. 29–46 (1974); Robert Solow, On the Intergenerational Allocation of Natural 
Resources, 88 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 141 (1986). 
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as from sound economic practice.17 Sustainability cannot simply be a 
matter of economic efficiency. Because sustainable development 
seeks to ensure that future generations are at least as well off, on a 
welfare basis, as current generations, it is, even in economic terms, a 
matter of intergenerational equity.18 Advocates of this position view 
sustainability policy as a form of intergenerational social contract.19 
The idea that intergenerational resource allocation is a question of 
morality, rather than economic efficiency, can be traced to the 
teachings of the world’s major religions.20 In the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, according to Genesis, “God gave the earth to [H]is people 
and their offspring as an everlasting possession, to be cared for and 
passed on to each generation.”21 Edith Brown Weiss argues that this 
passage is understood by Christian and Jewish morality as an 
obligation on each generation not to use more than necessary and to 
pass the earth on to the next generation in equal or better condition.22 
Though some biblical scholars have cited practice to contest this 
interpretation,23 Weiss’s reading is textually sound and so should 
warrant consideration in the larger debate over the existence of a 
universal moral principle of intergenerational equity. 
Furthermore, under Islamic law, the earth is considered “ni’amah” 
(God’s bounty), and is to be held in trust for future generations and 
Allah.24 Indeed, the Qur’an repeatedly preaches intergenerational 
equity in natural resource use, and the Prophet Muhammad is 
believed to have encouraged sustainable use of scarce fertile lands as 
well as active management of unused parcels.25 Edith Brown Weiss’s 
retelling of Islamic teaching even more closely echoes the principles 
	
17 See, e.g., Richard Howarth & Richard Norgaard, R.B, Intergenerational Resource 
Rights, Efficiency and Social Optimality, 66 LAND ECON. 1 (1990). 
18 R. KERRY TURNER, SPECULATIONS ON WEAK AND STRONG SUSTAINABILITY 6 
(1992). 
19 Id. 
20 See WEISS, supra note 13, at 18–21. 
21 Id. at 19 (citing Genesis 1:1–31, 17:7–8). 
22 Id. at 19. 
23 See Paul A. Barresi, Beyond Fairness to Future Generations: An Intragenerational 
Alternative to Intergenerational Equity in the International Environmental Arena, 11 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 59, 65–66 (1997) (citing Lynn White, Jr., The Historical Roots of Our 
Ecological Crisis, 155 SCI. 1203 (1967) (contending that the relationship of the Judeo-
Christian tradition to the environment has been antipathetic at best, and hostile at worst, 
both in theory and in practice; therefore, Weiss has misinterpreted the cited Biblical 
passage by reading it out of context with the implicated religious traditions)). 
24 See SIRAJ SAIT & HILARY LIM, LAND, LAW & ISLAM 25 (2006). 
25 Id. 
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of sustainability in the doctrine of waste; the present generation is 
entitled to the use of earth’s resources to meet its needs, but must not 
prejudice the ability of future generations to use it to meet their 
needs.26 
African tribal customs also operated much like the later developed 
doctrine of waste, often treating the members of the present 
generation as mere tenants on the land, with obligations to both future 
and past generations.27 The oft-cited nontheistic religions of Asia 
have for centuries invoked related principles, such as respect for the 
natural world and the needs of future generations. It has even been 
argued that intergenerational equity stands as a universal concept that 
bridges the philosophical gap between individualism in Western 
religions and traditions and communitarianism in their Eastern 
counterparts.28 Regardless of whether or not this lofty claim of 
universality holds fully true, there can be no doubt that some 
semblance of regard for future generations exists at the core of the 
moral teachings of a preponderance of the world’s major religions. 
Others still have pointed to an even more ancient source of 
intergenerational equity—biology. Biology provides a basis for the 
obligation from one generation of a species to the next because of the 
evolutionary relationship between those groups. The contention is that 
the human brain is hardwired with respect to preservation of the 
species, particularly of close family lineage, and people have no 
choice but to care about future generations; it is in our nature. This 
natural inclination results from the Darwinian dynamic, which, while 
often misconstrued as a struggle for mere existence, is really a 
struggle for reproductive success. In this struggle, each subgroup of 
the human race strives to prolong the continued existence of particular 
genes.29 Actions taken in concern for future generations then become 
an essential part of success in natural selection. This biological 
conception of such obligations has the advantage of appealing to the 
very essence of our being and avoiding any taint from affiliation with 
a particular religious tenet or attitude towards nature. The challenge 
of relying on this reasoning is substantial. Primarily, there is the 
	
26 WEISS, supra note 13, at 18. 
27 Id. at 20. 
28 See Richard P. Hiskes, The Right to a Green Future: Human Rights, 
Environmentalism, and Intergenerational Justice, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 1346, 1359–61 (2005). 
29 Barresi, supra note 23, at 69–70. 
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necessary premise that moral obligations flow from biological 
inclinations rather than an attempt to combat or mitigate such 
instincts. Accepting this controversial premise, and taking it to its 
logical conclusion, leads to some very uneasy results. Take, for 
example, the situation of overpopulation. Under this biological moral 
reasoning, not only would it be acceptable for one subgroup to 
eliminate the offspring of another in the interest of long-term 
preservation; it would be morally required for them to do so. Because 
dealing with this difficult issue is beyond the scope of this article, it is 
important to simply note that our natural inclination supports the 
positive moral theory advanced by the aforementioned religions and 
the subsequently referenced philosophers; whether the natural 
inclination alone carries moral weight need not be decided here. 
There have also existed, for quite some time, writings that rely on 
philosophical reasoning, rather than biology or religion, to support the 
proposition that intergenerational moral obligations exist. In John 
Locke’s The Second Treatise of Government, he reasoned that when a 
man labors to extract common resources, labor is the property of the 
laborer and so the laborer alone is entitled to its fruits; however, he 
wrote, because he has taken from the commons, this principle applies 
only where at least there is enough (quantity), and as good (quality), 
left for others (presumably to use in the future).30 Locke’s approach to 
shared resource use has exactly the intergenerational backstop argued 
for in this work. The reasoning is sound; if a resource is meant to be 
shared and used by each who is entitled to some, it should not be 
morally permissible for one actor (a generation in this case) to take so 
much as to deprive the others of the same resource in terms of 
quantity and quality. No one generation’s entitlement trumps the 
other. This reasoning closely parallels Social Contract Theory, which 
was echoed by Bruce Ackerman when he helped to rekindle 
philosophical discussion of intergenerational equity in the 1970s.31 
	
30 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 27 (J.W. Gough ed., 3d ed. 
1966). 
It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by 
this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: 
for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can 
have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as 
good, left in common for others. 
Id. 
31 Scholars attribute the resurgence of academic discourse concerning intergenerational 
equity to chapters in two influential works around the 1970s: BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, 
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 107–221, 203 (1980) (Part II entitled “Justice  
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Ackerman wrote “all citizens are at least as good as one another 
regardless of their date of birth.”32 If one accepts this rather 
uncontroversial premise, it follows that no generation has rights 
superior to others, past or future, and the reasoning above concerning 
each entitlement holds. A few years prior to Ackerman’s work, John 
Rawls propounded a similar theory of intergenerational justice based 
on capital accumulation. Rawls contended that no generation should 
be placed in a worse position than the preceding generation. He saw 
this principle as involving the maintenance and preservation of both 
specific cultural resources and undefined “capital.” He wrote that 
“[e]ach generation must not only preserve the gains of culture and 
civilization, and maintain intact those just institutions that they have 
established, but it must also put aside in each period of time a suitable 
amount of real capital accumulation.”33 These conceptions of 
intergenerational equity fit neatly with the aforementioned biblical 
and biological arguments, as well as with the existence of a legal 
doctrine that recognizes concrete obligations to future generations. 
B. Intergenerational Rights and Duties 
As the discussion above makes clear, operationalizing the concept 
of intergenerational equity requires relying on the existence of some 
duties, or obligations, and rights. The duties owed by each generation 
to the next are what sustainability theory seeks to define, often 
through the use of economic models. In simple terms, the obligations 
on the current generation are most commonly summarized as: (1) a 
duty to pass on the earth and its natural resources to the next 
generation in the same or equivalent condition as it was when that 
generation first received it and (2) a duty to repair any damage caused 
by a failure of any previous generation to do the same.34 These 
obligations would fall on each successive generation, in turn, as a 
class or group rather than on particular individuals. 
If the present generation has the above-described duties, 
corresponding rights may vest in future generations. The most 
elementary of such rights is the right to demand that the present 
	
Over Time”) and J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 284–93 (1971) (chapter entitled “The 
Problem of Justice Between Generations”). 
32 ACKERMAN, supra note 31. 
33 RAWLS, supra note 31, at 285. 
34 See WEISS, supra note 13, at 23–26; see also Barresi, supra note 23. 
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generation use the earth and its resources sustainably;35 or, couching 
the right not in terms of the claim against persons but in terms of the 
property or the environment itself, a right to inherit the earth and 
natural resources in a state comparable to the previous generation.36 
Regardless of the precise conception, the mere contention that a right 
exists raises several difficult questions. The logically first query is 
whether this right necessarily flows only from the existence of a 
corresponding obligation. If not, there is no reason to discuss the 
difficulties of to whom precisely the right attaches. A conception that 
avoids such a simplistic logical out instead argues that the rights arise 
out of a contract between generations, presumably providing adequate 
consideration to the present for carrying out the aforementioned 
obligations.37 
One need not delve into the difficulties of intergenerational 
contract law to find the conclusion that duties must be accompanied 
by rights. In the early twentieth century, the esteemed jurist Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld succinctly reasoned that in order to ascribe a 
“definite and appropriate meaning” to an asserted right, a “correlative 
‘duty’” must exist.38 Conversely, this logic suggests that without the 
actionable claim of rights, duties are hollowed out to the point of 
moral irrelevance. Put another way, if no one has a right to demand 
some specific thing (a “claim” to it), no one has a real obligation to 
provide that thing.39 In the intergenerational context, it is thus argued 
that no obligations exist because justice intrinsically requires this type 
of reciprocity with other individuals, and the whole idea of having 
reciprocal relations with persons who do not yet exist is illogical.40 
There are two ways to dispel this flawed conclusion. The first is to 
dispose of the notion that obligations or duties cannot exist without 
corresponding rights. Second, even if one cannot be persuaded by the 
first premise, the presumption that rights attach only to individuals 
can be soundly rejected. 
	
35 Barresi, supra note 23, at 77–78. 
36 See, e.g., Hiskes, supra note 28. For a comprehensive list of rights see the Cousteau 
Society’s proposed Bill of Rights for Future Generations, which gathered more than 1.5 
million signatures worldwide. (cited in Edith Brown Weiss, A Reply to Barresi’s “Beyond 
Fairness to Future Generations,” 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 89, 97 (1997)). 
37 WEISS, supra note 13, at 17, 21, 24–25, 47, 95. 
38 WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN 
JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 38 (1923). 
39 See id. 
40 Terence Ball, The Incoherence of Intergenerational Justice, 28 INQUIRY 321 (1985). 
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Obligations without reciprocal rights have been part of our social 
construct for hundreds, if not thousands, of years. John Austin 
identified a class of absolute duties, which prescribe actions toward 
parties who are not determinate persons, such as members generally 
of society and of humankind at large; he envisioned no correlative 
rights attaching to these obligations.41 This is a perfectly logical way 
to describe the type of obligation that exists between generations, 
where the duty is also to indeterminate persons. The problem persists, 
however, with regards to where the responsibility, or even the power, 
to enforce these obligations lies. Traditionally the answer has been 
with the state—specifically the liability and property rules of the legal 
system.42 Without a legal rule protecting their interests, future 
generations would fall victim to the flawed decision principle of 
“might makes right,”43 as present generations are necessarily stronger 
and hence their interests would always win preference.44 Fortunately, 
society has wisely chosen to adopt legal rules that modify the default 
principle, so even the weaker physical or political interest will at 
times prevail.45 The waste doctrine embodies such a situation. 
Outside the context of actions towards indeterminate persons, one 
can also find examples in practice of legally recognized obligations 
without corresponding rights in the beneficiary. One such example is 
the execution of a person’s last wishes or a will. The rights in this 
case would necessarily be in a past person, which is just as “illogical” 
as rights vesting in a future person. Assuming that a past person can 
him or herself take no action to assert an alleged right, if society still 
recognizes the obligation to carry out the deceased’s wishes, which it 
certainly does,46 it must also then accept that those obligations can 
exist without reciprocal rights. 
	
41 See 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 412–15 (Robert Campbell ed. 
4th ed., London, John Murray 1875). 
42 See Guido Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972) 
(explaining that the state, through its legal system, must decide which side to favor when 
confronted with conflicting interests). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 As has been the practice for centuries, the legal system continues to give effect to a 
testator’s wishes even when circumstances change such that a bequest becomes 
impossible, impracticable, or illegal to carry out. In such a situation, the cy-près doctrine 
dictates that a court should amend the bequest so it is executed as nearly as possible 
according to the testator’s expressed intent. Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539, 540 (1867). 
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Perhaps more compelling still is the notion that reciprocity between 
generations as groups is much less problematic than on an individual 
scale. Reciprocity in the group context means only that each 
generation is afforded the same protection from environmental harms 
so long as each fulfills its duty. This reciprocity comes from the fact 
that by respecting, or neglecting, future generation’s environmental 
rights, the present generation strengthens, or weakens, its own claim 
to those same rights. Even if the rights of future generations burden 
the present, they nevertheless strengthen current rights to a safe 
environment by offering support for environmentally conscious 
policies.47 Because each generation necessarily feels the effects of 
how it treats its obligations to the next, reciprocity is maintained. 
Although this may not be the precise type of reciprocity imagined by 
critics, it serves the function of preserving justice nonetheless. 
Perhaps no one specific future person can, practically speaking, hold 
one current person accountable for neglect of his duty, but the next 
generation as a group does compel the present generation’s actions 
morally and should also have the ability to do so legally, relying on 
the doctrine of waste. 
In sum, although the philosophical debate is far from settled, 
claims of a moral obligation to future generations have ancient roots 
and are supported by sound reason. This counsels against denying the 
existence of a moral component to contemporary sustainability 
analyses. Furthermore, the very existence of historical equitable 
claims supports the proposition that intergenerational considerations 
were not ignored in the formation of the law, especially the doctrine 
of waste, which explicitly focused on intertemporal resource 
allocation. 
III 
THE DOCTRINE OF WASTE 
A. Roots of the Doctrine 
Most legal reference texts simply define the doctrine of waste as 
the principle that the present owner should not be able to use property 
in a manner that unreasonably interferes with the expectations of the 
	
47 Hiskes, supra note 28, at 1355–56. 
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future owner.48 However, the doctrine’s rich history must inform 
one’s reading of such contemporary definitions. 
The English doctrine of waste predates, and in fact formed the 
basis for, the American version. Despite its common roots, there 
exists a distinguishing philosophical conception at the heart of the 
English doctrine that did not survive the transplant to the New World. 
English law conceived the protected interest of the future owner to 
have a normative social component as well as an economic one. This 
almost certainly results from the influence of the feudal system on the 
formation of the legal rule. 
The English rule dates to the year 1267 (if not earlier), when the 
first reference to waste was penned in the Statute of Marlborough, 
which proclaimed, “[farmers], during their terms, shall not make 
[w]aste . . . .”49 Over time, as landlords invoked the doctrine, the 
common law surrounding it evolved in a uniquely European way. The 
rich law became a set of prerogatives, proscribing certain actions as 
waste per se.50 Courts held that, as a matter of law, present interest 
holders were strictly forbidden from specific activities, regardless of 
their effect on the value of the estate. In this way, the nature and 
character of the estate were preserved, not simply the profits 
generated therefrom. William Blackstone described the rule as 
forbidding “a spoil and destruction of the estate . . . by demolishing 
not the temporary profits only, but the very substance of the thing       
. . . .”51 
When the colonies began to assimilate the common law of 
England, doctrines were frequently adapted to suit the needs of the 
new country. The doctrine of waste was one such legal principle, and 
so the American version was born. The American doctrine of waste 
represented a transformation from a British rule that emphasized the 
present interest holder’s subordinate position in a feudal hierarchy 
and inferior social status to a new rule that embraced the republican 
	
48 See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & 
MICHAEL H. SCHILL, PROPERTY 201 (6th ed. 2006). 
49 Statute of Marlborough, 1267, 52 Hen. 3, c. 23, § 2 (Eng.). 
50 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 281–82 
(1765); see generally 1 EDWARD COKE, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 53a–b (18th 
ed. 1823) (noting that tenants could take from the land only the timber that was necessary 
for maintaining buildings, making tools, and warming themselves in winter, called 
respectively “house bote,” “tool bote,” and “fire bote”). 
51 BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at 281. 
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theme in American property law, which conceived of landholding 
without the strict caste structure of feudal European empires.52 
There were two common components to the law of waste in 
nineteenth century America, which were sometimes read as separate 
definitions.53 The first held the present interest holder to the standard 
of husbandry, deeming an action not to be waste if it were consistent 
with the actions a prudent owner would take; the second, and more 
commonly cited idea, was based on the standard of material injury, 
which forbid a permanent injury to the inheritance.54 Many states 
formulated their own variations on these general doctrinal themes.55 
The instrumental case in interpreting the new American standard 
was Jackson v. Brownson,56 decided in 1810. In that case, the 
plaintiffs contended that the clearing of forest constituted waste under 
the English rule, while the defendant denied that clearing timber to 
make way for cultivation could count as waste.57 A majority of the 
New York Supreme Court58 ruled that the action did constitute waste, 
but relied upon the defendant’s interpretation of the doctrine to reach 
their conclusion, holding that actions that did “a permanent injury to 
the inheritance” constituted waste.59 This ruling solidified a stark 
operational difference between the English and American rules; while 
the English doctrine of waste evolved as a set of definite prerogatives, 
the American version would be defined only by adaptable standards. 
Jedediah Purdy contends that the American courts created a distinct 
law of waste for three primary reasons,60 which all help in 
understanding how the doctrine should govern our present-day 
interactions with the environment and natural resources. First, the 
	
52 See John A. Lovett, Doctrines of Waste in a Landscape of Waste, 72 MO. L. REV. 
1209, 1231 (2007); see also Purdy, supra note 12, at 661, 667. 
53 Purdy, supra note 12, at 660. 
54 Id. 
55 See, e.g., Clemence v. Steere, 1 R.I. 272, 274 (1850) (“it [was] necessary to show 
that the change [was] detrimental to the inheritance . . .”); Shine v. Wilcox, 21 N.C. (1 
Dev. & Bat.) 631 (1837) (“the cutting down of  timber [was] not waste, unless it [did] a 
lasting damage to the inheritance, and deteriorate[d] its value; and not then, if no more was 
cut down than was necessary for the ordinary enjoyment of the land . . .”); Keeler v. 
Eastman, 11 Vt. 293, 294 (1839) (holding that the tenant could act freely, but “not so as to 
cause damage to the inheritance”). 
56 Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns. 227 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810). 
57 Id. 
58 At the time the New York Supreme Court was the highest court in the state. 
59 Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns. at 232. 
60 Purdy, supra note 12, at 662. 
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American judiciary wanted to promote efficient use of resources that 
the English rule would have inhibited,61 chiefly ameliorative waste—
actions that changed the character of the land but increased the value 
of the estate.62 Secondly, the newly interpreted doctrine aimed to 
advance an idea of American landholding as a republican enterprise.63 
Thirdly, American courts were attempting to advance the belief that a 
natural duty to cultivate wild land underlay the Anglo-American 
claim to North America.64 For these reasons, and undoubtedly 
unexplored others, the American doctrine began as a standard rich in 
the language of economic preservation and purposely devoid of any 
indication of normative social preservation. 
As the history of the doctrine indicates, there exists a very real 
tension between a purely economic understanding of what constitutes 
waste—one that looks for a diminution in the market value of the 
property—and an understanding founded on the normative 
prerogative of the future interest holder to dictate what changes can or 
cannot be made to the property.65 Put another way, the distinction 
runs deeper than American versus English; it is a philosophical choice 
between a purely utilitarian model of waste and a social formulation 
of waste.66 This philosophical debate manifested itself in the distinct 
rules on each side of the Atlantic: the United States courts put future 
and present estates on equal footing with respect to use decisions 
while the courts in England protected the wishes of the “superior” 
future estate.67 
Because the Americans adapted the rule from the British, however, 
the tension between economic and social value preservation remained 
when the courts interpreted the American doctrine. The First 
Restatement of Property reflected this tension by adopting two 
seemingly conflicting definitions of actions that could constitute 
voluntary waste: section 138 stated that a life tenant has a duty not to 
diminish the ‘market value’ of the subsequent interests, and section 
	
61 Id.; see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 54–
55 (1977) (citing similar reasons related to economic development). 
62 See DUKEMINIER ET. AL., supra note 48 (a more refined definition of this concept). 
63 Purdy, supra note 12, at 662. 
64 Id.; see also Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. 137, 145 (1829) (“The country was a 
wilderness, and the universal policy was to procure its cultivation and improvement.”). 
65 Lovett, supra note 52, at 1212. 
66 Id. 
67 Purdy, supra note 12, at 687. 
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140 held a life tenant to “a duty not to change the premises . . . in such 
a manner that the owners of the interests limited after the estate for 
life have reasonable ground for objection thereto.”68 Because the 
doctrine of waste exists at common law, the degree to which 
American courts recognize the dual motivations for the original 
doctrine can shift, and has shifted, depending on the historical context 
and specific rationale. 
From a purely economic perspective, waste law addresses the 
problem of inefficient incentives faced by present interest holders.69 
Under this reasoning, the law should dictate an efficient management 
strategy that will maximize the present discounted value of the 
estate’s entire expected earnings stream rather than just the earnings 
for the length of the tenancy.70 Without such a coordinating rule, the 
present interest holder’s perverse incentive will lead to premature 
harvesting of natural resources and to neglect of both manmade and 
natural resources, the incremental decay of which has no effect on 
present earnings prospects but  diminishes  the long-term value of the 
estate.71 Facing this inefficiency, a coordinating rule is preferable to a 
free market solution because efficiency-seeking, Coasian bargaining 
is unlikely to occur between parties who are typically locked into 
bilateral monopolies laden with high transaction costs.72 
The coordinating rule most staunchly advocated for by economists 
is actually a standard that would hold the tenant to an obligation to act 
as if he or she were the owner in fee simple.73 This is essentially the 
American definition of waste in its most extreme form. This standard 
is guided purely by the market value of the land and thus treats land 
as nothing more than a commodity with a monetary value that must 
be preserved.74 
As noted, the original English doctrine, and consequently the 
common law basis for the American rule, not only served an 
economic goal but also performed a normative status-confirming role. 
And despite the best efforts of some “manifest destiny” era judges 
	
68 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. §§ 138, 140 (1936) (emphasis added). 
69 See POSNER, supra note 10, at § 3.11, at 73. 
70 Purdy, supra note 12, at 659. 
71 Id. at 659–60. 
72 Lovett, supra note 52, at 1229. 
73 See POSNER, supra note 10, at 71–74. 
74 Purdy, supra note 12, at 688. 
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and economists,75 a social value-preserving component did exist even 
in American courts. Distinguishing between similar cases with 
opposite holdings illuminates judicial hesitation to permit a tenant to 
impose a qualitative change in land use on a future interest holder, 
even when the change arguably improved the overall value of the 
estate.76 In at least one respected property law treatise, the influence 
of the English normative rule still rears its head in the form of the 
“intention approach.”77 These interpretations of the American law 
suggest that the doctrine of waste protects more than a quantitative 
economic interest; it must protect some qualitative components of the 
estate as well. 
B. Sustainability 
Despite the different motivations behind the English and American 
waste doctrines with respect to social hierarchy, both have long had a 
secondary motivation that very closely resembles the “modern” 
concept of sustainability.78 These doctrines, as attempts to preserve an 
estate for future use and prevent deterioration, are in essence concrete 
legal rules of sustainability. 
The most telling example of the concrete law of sustainability in 
practice comes from the English courts, which held that tenants could 
take from the land only the timber that was necessary for maintaining 
buildings, making tools, and warming themselves in winter.79 Notice 
that the courts had no problem limiting the present interest holder’s 
	
75 See, e.g., Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns. 227, 237 (Spencer, J. dissenting) (“The 
doctrine of waste, as understood in England, is inapplicable to a new, unsettled country.”). 
76 Compare Pynchon v. Stearns, 52 Mass. 304, 310 (1846) (holding no waste in the 
activity of a tenant who had cut drainage ditches, dug cellars, and filled in wetlands) with 
Livingston v. Reynolds, 26 Wend. 115 (N.Y. 1841) (finding of waste for tenant to build a 
brick kiln and cut all but eight or ten of one hundred and eighty acres of forest to fire it. If 
the Chancellor considered brick-making compatible with good husbandry, the court 
contended, the peculiar ideas of the Chancellor of good husbandry “must differ materially 
from the generally received opinion of the world,” as must his idea of waste). 
77 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 20.1–20.23 (James Casner ed., 1952). This 
approach dictates that the grantor must have intended for the subsequent interest holder to 
receive his or her land at the end of the life estate, not in an unaltered state, or even in a 
state with equivalent or enhanced market value, but substantially undamaged by the use 
and of the life tenant. Lovett, supra note 52, at 1212. 
78 It should be noted, however, that much stronger ties to sustainability exist in the 
English doctrine because of its emphasis on preserving normative, as well as economic, 
values. 
79 BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at 281–82; COKE, supra note 50, at 53a–b. 
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ability to grow the estate or make excessive profits; he or she was to 
take only what was truly needed to sustain a way of life. This sounds 
remarkably similar to modern advocates of no-growth or steady-state 
economics in the interest of resource preservation.80 Perhaps 
counterintuitively, American courts even more directly advocated for 
no-growth economics: the Supreme Court of North Carolina wrote in 
1888 dicta that “it may be proper to fix a limit to the denudation, that 
it do not exceed the annual increase from natural growth which 
replaces that portion of the trees removed.”81 
Notwithstanding these and other prominent references, Purdy notes 
that historically the principle of sustainable use tended in practice to 
remain fairly abstract, with courts resolving most waste cases by a 
conventional American standard analogous to “permanent injury” or 
“material prejudice.”82 Furthermore, John Sprankling and other 
natural resource scholars contend that an instrumentalist view of 
nature, together with a perceived imperative to bring the new 
continent under the axe and plough, drove the early American law of 
waste to develop not fully along the lines of sustainable use, but 
rather towards a supposed good husbandry standard, which allowed 
clearing and developing land in the interest of advancing cultivation.83 
Because of this observation, Sprankling sees in traditional American 
waste doctrine a lack of proper regard for the land’s intrinsic worth in 
an unspoiled state.84 
As a constantly transforming doctrine, American waste law has 
been influenced over time by the sustainability principles at its core. 
Indicating this influence, the study of the American transformation of 
waste law reveals three classes of values shaping the doctrine. 
Alongside economic efficiency and republican ideals, one finds the 
idea of an appropriate relationship to the natural world at the heart of 
the waste doctrine’s evolution, which in the nineteenth century may 
have encouraged productivity and improvement, but in the modern 
	
80 See, e.g., MEINHARD MIEGEL, EXIT: PROSPERITY WITHOUT GROWTH (translation) 
(2010); PETER G. BROWN & GEOFFREY GARVER, RIGHT RELATIONSHIP: BUILDING A 
WHOLE EARTH ECONOMY (2009). 
81 King v. Miller, 6 S.E. 660, 666 (N.C. 1888); see also Smith v. Smith, 31 S.E. 135, 
136 (Ga. 1898). 
82 Purdy, supra note 12, at 674. 
83 See John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 519, 533–36 (1996). 
84 Id. 
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era is perhaps founded on an ethos of conservation or stewardship.85 
As the country and the world move forward in dealing with an 
increasingly complex human/nature relationship, particularly in the 
context of climate change, this important doctrine must have 
something to say about the way to proceed. 
C. The Modern Doctrine 
Undoubtedly, the American doctrine of waste has some role to play 
in confronting contemporary environmental issues, and defining that 
role should become the task of modern jurists and scholars. With the 
historical roots of the doctrine fully exposed, the missing component 
for such analysis lies in understanding the modern operation of the 
doctrine. Unfortunately, relatively little contemporary academic 
scholarship has addressed the waste doctrine in depth,86 leaving the 
legal technician to peruse the traditional treatises and the meager case 
law. 
According to the Second Restatement of Property, it is now 
generally said that in the United States a present interest holder may 
“make changes in the physical condition of the . . . property which are 
reasonably necessary in order for the tenant to use the . . . property in 
a manner that is reasonable under all the circumstances.”87 The 
doctrine of waste has taken on the all-too-familiar amorphous 
“reasonableness” standard that has become the poster child of 
American common law courts. The “reasonable use” standard in the 
waste context has been interpreted to require the judge, when 
considering whether an action constitutes waste, to consider not only 
the resulting changed market value of the property, but also standards 
of conduct imposed under the instrument creating the estate, 
community customs, public policy requirements, and new conditions 
and circumstances surrounding the proposed use.88 This suggests that 
environmental public policy and the drastically changed conditions as 
	
85 Purdy, supra note 12, at 697. For conservationist perspectives on the relationship of 
humans to the natural world, see generally WENDELL BERRY, THE UNSETTLING OF 
AMERICA: CULTURE & AGRICULTURE (1977); ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY 
ALMANAC (1949); GARY SNYDER, THE PRACTICE OF THE WILD (1990). 
86 Lovett, supra note 52, at 1209. 
87 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORDS & TENANTS § 12.2(1) (1977) 
(emphasis added). 
88 Lovett, supra note 52, at 1215. 
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a result of climate change not only could, but must, inform the 
determination of actions constituting waste. 
In the face of changed circumstances, courts and commentators 
generally claim that the possessory interest holder can make 
improvements, repairs, and alterations in the property, as long as 
these actions do not cause long-term harms or risks to the future 
interest holder.89 With the tendency of courts and legislators to 
abandon bright line versions of waste doctrine and muddy it in 
spasms of doctrinal transformation when facing moments of rapid and 
profound change, it is rather likely that the effects of climate change 
on the ability to use the property will weigh heavily in contemporary 
waste determinations.90 However, recent decisions regarding the use 
of timber demonstrate that American courts have not yet fully 
embraced the preservationist-oriented view of the doctrine, 
subrogating future interest holders’ pleas for selective cutting or no 
cutting at all in favor of the interests of short-term possessory estate 
holders who wish to engage in significant commercial tree farming 
activity.91 
Development of property and contract law with respect to uses tied 
to other environmental concerns beyond climate change has been 
encouraging. The most promising example comes in the context of 
water law, where the doctrine of waste has long been utilized as a tool 
for controlling common resources.92 It would be quite reasonable to 
import a similar approach for the management of other important 
natural resources, particularly those that are threatened by or 
contribute to climate change. 
	
89 Id. at 1226–27. 
90 Cf. id. at 1212. 
91 See, e.g., Robinson v. Hunter, 562 S.E.2d 189, 190–91 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding 
that life tenant may cut timber and keep all of the proceeds as long as harvesting is in 
conformity with “good husbandry” and not “solely” for profit); White v. Watts, 812 So. 2d 
328, 332 (Ala. 2001) (permitting life tenant to harvest timber between 42% and 70% of 
trees on a tree farm because she had set upon a proper “management program” designed to 
produce steady income); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 699 So. 2d 351, 357–60 (La. 1996) (on 
rehearing) (rejecting “open mines” approach and holding that ninety-one-year-old 
usufructuary is entitled to clear cut 143 acre tract of “timberlands” that had never been 
professionally harvested in the past, over the objection of seventy-year-old naked owner 
who sought to limit harvest to selective cutting, on the basis that a clear cut and replanting 
with genetically modified seedlings would commence a plan of prudent timber 
administration of the tract). 
92 See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 124–26 (3d ed. 
2000) (for an analogous discussion of the law of waste as it applies to shared water 
resources). 
MOFFA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2013  10:28 AM 
2012] Wasting the Planet: What a Storied Doctrine of Property 479 
Brings to Bear on Environmental Law and Climate Change 
Another environmentally progressive example comes from a long 
line of Louisiana mineral lease cases. The problem that has arisen in 
recent years is whether a mineral lessee has a duty to restore the 
surface of the land to its pre-lease condition at the termination of the 
mineral lease and, if such a duty exists, whether there are economic 
limits to the liability of a mineral lessee who breaches this duty.”93 
Before Louisiana had adopted a specific Mineral Code, one decision 
had clearly recognized that the mineral lessee had a duty to restore the 
land’s surface, even if the lease was silent on this subject,94 but 
another had imposed a reasonableness limitation on the extent of 
those damages.95 A much more recent case came down even stronger 
in support of landowners and environmental restoration, resulting in a 
$33 million restoration award with no constraint for reasonableness 
when the estimated market value of the land was less than $110,000.96 
What the state of the law in these contexts demonstrates is that 
courts, legislators, law reformers, and scholars have increasingly felt 
compelled to create waste standards that hold both parties to some 
external standards of reasonableness that are grounded, at least in 
part, in concern for ameliorating the external spillover effects of the 
parties’ behavior on the larger community.97 Considering the degree 
of potential harm, the most significant externality that must be 
considered in modern waste determinations is contribution to climate 
change.98 
D. Climate Waste Litigation 
It is a useful exercise to consider the range of potential litigation 
involving waste law and climate change not because success is likely 
through the most innovative uses of the doctrine, but instead because 
such uses of the law, even in a hypothetical academic context, help to 
	
93 Lovett, supra note 52, at 1234–35. 
94 Smith v. Schuster, 66 So. 2d 430, 431–32 (La. Ct. App. 1953). 
95 Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So. 2d 253, 255 (La. Ct. App. 1958). 
96 Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003). see also Terrebonne Parish Sch. 
Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789 (La. 2005) (holding even more recently that 
“where the mineral lease expressly grants the lessee the right to alter the surface” and “is 
silent regarding restoration,” then “article 122 [of the LA Mineral Code] only imposes a 
duty to restore the surface to its original condition where there is evidence of unreasonable 
or excessive use”). 
97 Lovett, supra note 52, at 1257. 
98 Cf. JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY 138 (2010) (“Climate change 
threatens to be the externality that ate the world.”). 
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inform the policy discussion.99 In order to articulate a claim, one 
needs to conceive of property interests in an unprecedented, but not 
unheard of, way. Margaret Thatcher phrased the relevant interests 
nicely in her 1988 Conservative Party Conference address, claiming 
that “[n]o generation has a freehold on this [e]arth. All we (as the 
current generation) have is a life tenancy, with a full repairing 
lease.”100 With this conception of property interests in the earth, or at 
least its natural resources, the next generation holds the future interest 
and should therefore be entitled to a waste-free tenancy on our part. 
This may seem far removed from the traditional notion of interests in 
land at property law, but conceiving the present generations’ interests 
as life tenancies actually closely aligns with reality. Because no 
deceased person can hold real property, all property currently owned 
must necessarily pass to someone of the next or at least continuing 
generation.101 However, one must acknowledge that even considering 
the practical argument just articulated, the rewriting of property 
interests in line with Thatcher’s theory would require more than legal 
pragmatism; it would require deeper philosophical changes regarding 
society’s notion of private property.102 
Although the theoretical approach just articulated seems far-
fetched at first glance, in fact, similar doctrine already exists to 
facilitate the appropriate management of lands held in trust for public 
use;103 the hypothesized approach would simply utilize the waste 
	
99 See generally Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited 
Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350 (2011). 
100 Jonathon Porritt, A Full Repairing Lease on Planet Earth, in THE IDEA OF 
PROPERTY IN HISTORY AND MODERN TIMES 49 (Colin Kolbert ed.) (1997); see also 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (2000) (framing 
“each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations”); WEISS, supra 
note 13, at 17 (“We, as a species, hold the natural and cultural environment of our planet 
in common, both with members of the present generation and with other generations, past 
and future.”). 
101 This is further supported by the strong legal reform movement against “dead hand 
control,” which severely limited a landholder’s ability to dictate the uses perpetuated on 
his property after his death, regardless of the specific interest (freehold, life estate, etc.) 
that said person held while living. For a concrete example on this in action, look to the 
development of the rule against perpetuities. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 394 (6th ed. 2003) for a detailed explanation of this rule and the 
rationale behind it. 
102 See WEISS, supra note 13, at 61 (noting the challenge of creating such an interest is 
“as much spiritual as it is political. A full repairing lease could not be maintained without a 
philosophical revolution at least as dramatic as that of the seventeenth century.”). 
103 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 485–89 (1970). 
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doctrine to include future generations as “trustees.”104 Furthermore, 
one could imagine expanding the category of lands legally said to be 
“held in public trust” to all those lands not currently held in fee 
simple. Admittedly, this requires some careful manipulation of 
property law concepts; however, it avoids the very difficult problem 
of reclassifying previously fee simple interests as life estates. 
As the roots of the doctrine of waste demonstrate, sustainability, as 
a regard for future interest holders in the use of an estate’s resources, 
has long been a concrete legal concept. Whether preserving economic 
or normative values, the doctrine of waste establishes legal 
obligations relating to human interactions with the environment. The 
question that this brief study of American and English waste law 
purports to answer in the affirmative is whether such obligations exist 
with respect to the mitigation of threatening climate change harms. 
IV 
ANALOGS OF VARIOUS TESTS FROM THE DOCTRINE OF WASTE IN 
SUSTAINABILITY THEORY 
The traditional American and English iterations of the waste 
doctrine provide a natural and tested tool for fashioning sustainability 
rules on a local scale. As the case law demonstrates, the problem of 
intertemporal resource allocation has always been central to the 
application of the waste doctrine in specific situations. The age-old 
question of what precisely must be left to remaindermen is directly 
analogous to the modern questions concerning sustainable 
development and depletion of non-renewable resources. For this 
reason, the tests and rules applied in the courts of the early United 
States and United Kingdom have a particularly useful and novel 
application to the modern policy discussion. 
In addition to the natural fit of the waste doctrine reasoning with 
questions of sustainability, a deeper level of analytical significance 
exists because the choice between the extreme American and English 
versions of the waste doctrine maps quite nicely onto the debate 
between the concepts of “weak” and “strong” sustainability. Weak 
	
104 See Mary Wood & Susan O’Toole, How to Sue for Climate Change: The Public 
Trust Doctrine, 10 OUTLOOK: ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES SECTION 
(Or. State Bar Ass’n), Winter 2009, at 1–2 (advocating a very similar approach); see also 
Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 227, 244–46 (2001) 
(explaining how the public trust doctrine applies to the atmosphere). 
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sustainability, like the American waste doctrine, focuses on the total 
aggregate value of capital available to successors in interest. Weak 
sustainability assumes complete substitutability between man-made 
and natural capital and therefore permits depletion of resources so 
long as the overall value of capital stock, including new man-made 
capital, is not diminishing over time.105 The American version of the 
doctrine of waste takes a similar approach with regards to the value of 
the estate.106 In contrast, strong sustainability takes the position that at 
least some natural capital is non-substitutable and, therefore, certain 
actions that deprive successors in interest of this natural capital should 
be strictly avoided.107 The English version of the waste doctrine holds 
a similar firm line against changing the nature of an estate, even if the 
action purportedly increases the economic value of said estate.108 
This part will explore these sets of parallel reasoning further and 
demonstrate why something closer to the English model, and the 
accompanying modern concept of strong sustainability, should be 
preferred in law and policy. This will be accomplished through 
applications of the aforementioned early precedential cases and rules 
in the United States and England to the environmental problems 
presented by climate change. 
A. The American Doctrine and Weak Sustainability 
The historical treatment of the doctrine of waste in American 
common law provides a rather elementary, but strikingly applicable, 
test to evaluate the sustainability of a particular practice. As noted 
previously, the two-part test dictates that an action is waste (or 
unsustainable in this new context) when said action does permanent 
injury to the inheritance,109 and it is contrary to the ordinary course of 
	
105 ERIC NEUMAYER, WEAK VERSUS STRONG SUSTAINABILITY 1 (3d ed., 2010). 
106 See supra Part III. 
107 See TURNER, supra note 18, at 14. 
108 See supra Part III. 
109 Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns. 227, 232 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1810); Keeler v. Eastman, 11 
Vt. 293 (1839); Davis v. Clark, 40 Mo. App. 515 (1890); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF 
CONTRACT 335 (1907) (“[A]n injury done or suffered by the owner of the present estate 
which tends to destroy or lessen the value of the inheritance.”); 1 JOHN NEILSON TAYLOR,  
THE AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD & TENANT 430–31 (1904) (“[A] spoil or destruction 
in houses, lands or tenements, to the damage of him who is in reversion or remainder . . . it 
is a general principle that the law considers everything to be waste which does a 
permanent injury to the inheritance.”). 
MOFFA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2013  10:28 AM 
2012] Wasting the Planet: What a Storied Doctrine of Property 483 
Brings to Bear on Environmental Law and Climate Change 
good husbandry.110 As a survey of the early precedent indicates,111 
this test focuses on the economic detriment to the estate rather than 
the physical nature of the estate. Settlers in the new world were 
encouraged, in fact, to clear land upon which they were tenants 
because cultivated land increased the value of the fee simple estate.112 
The future owner then enjoyed increased wealth, and utility, because 
of the tenant’s actions that depleted one type of natural resource, 
usually timber.113 The logic that underlies this eighteenth to 
nineteenth century expansion and conversion land ethic is the very 
same logic that supports the modern day notion of weak 
sustainability. Weak sustainability is premised on the idea that actions 
are “sustainable” so long as they do not diminish the overall value of 
capital stock over time (“damage the inheritance”).114 
Whether the actions of the current generation have damaged the 
inheritance of the next in economic terms is the question posed by 
both the American doctrine of waste and weak sustainability theory. 
With respect to climate change, this requires looking at the projected 
diminution in property values that will result from continued rising 
temperatures. Persisting in activity that intensifies, rather than 
mitigates, climate change would constitute waste and be 
unsustainable in this weak model if said activity does not provide an 
equal or greater increase in capital that will be available to future 
generations. 
The potential harm to future generations in terms of pure loss of 
land interest just in the coastal states is enormous. The IPCC projects 
sea level rise of twenty centimeters by 2050, which combined with 
ongoing post-glacial subsidence, could result in a forty centimeter rise 
along the coasts of New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland.115 Sea level 
rise of this magnitude will result in almost sixty meters of erosion on 
	
110 Clemence v. Steere, 1 R.I. 272, 272 (1850). 
111 See supra Part III. 
112 See Sprankling, supra note 83, at 533–36. 
113 To test this supposed waste, by considering the reversioner injured by the acts done, 
is not warranted by law; and, in point of fact, when the premises were cleared of the 
timber, cleared land was more valuable than wooded land. (Jackson v. Brownson 7 Johns. 
at 236 (Spencer J., dissenting). 
114 NEUMAYER, supra note 105, at 1. 
115 EPA, Recent Study Suggests Sea Level Rise Could Threaten Beaches Along U.S. 
East Coast, http://water.epa.gov/type/oceb/nep/upload/2008_07_31_estuaries_coastlines 
_00jun.pdf (June 16, 2004, 2:00 PM) (referring to Stephen P. Leatherman et al., Sea Level 
Rise Shown to Drive Coastal Erosion, 81 Eos Trans. AGU 55 (2000)). 
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average in these mid-Atlantic states, which constitutes about two 
times the average beach width, necessarily decimating beachfront 
property interests.116 Such a significant loss of land, if nothing else, 
represents a serious devaluation of the future property interests. 
Estimates of the cumulative financial effect of a fifty centimeter rise 
in sea level on U.S. coastal property by 2100 range from roughly $20 
billion to $150 billion.117 Extensive thawing of the permafrost as a 
result of climate change also adversely affects property interests in 
some Northern states. Most notably, the permafrost that underlies 
most of Alaska has already begun melting significantly, causing, and 
threatening to cause, increased erosion, landslides, sinking of the 
ground surface, and disruption to forests, buildings, and 
infrastructure.118 In some parts of the state, the erosion from this 
thawing has resulted in coastlines retreating more than 1500 feet over 
the past few decades, which will force several Alaskan coastal 
villages to either fortify or relocate.119 When property becomes 
uninhabitable, the future interest in it becomes intensely, if not 
completely, devalued. 
As the above indicates, this determination of what is sustainable 
and what constitutes waste largely depends on the scale at which the 
policymaking calculation is made. On a local scale, the above 
consequences in terms of lost capital likely overshadow the additional 
capital generated by climate change-contributing activities in the 
coastal and extreme Northern regions.120 However, if the policy is 
examined at a national level, some significant carbon emitters could 
be acting “sustainably” in capital contribution terms. The American 
courts, in adjudicating claims of waste, have long dealt with a similar 
dilemma, even though interests in land are much more strictly 
	
116 See id.; see also Envtl. Prot. Agency, Climate Change Indicators in the United 
States, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/indicators/oceans/sea-level.html (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2012) (estimating that a two-foot rise in sea level would eliminate 
approximately 10,000 square miles of coastal land). 
117 JAMES W. NEUMANN ET AL., PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, SEA 
LEVEL RISE & GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: A REVIEW OF IMPACTS TO U.S. COASTS ( Feb. 
2000), available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/env_sealevel.pdf. 
118 Id. at 76; see also David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-so-Radical Idea: Tort-
Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 18 (2003) (discussing the 
property, buildings, and infrastructure harmed by thawing permafrost). 
119 Grossman, supra note 118, at 15. 
120 But see J.B. Ruhl, What Should We Do About the Climate Change Winners 22–26 
(Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 11-30, 2012) 
(noting the definition and existence of “climate change winners” in economic terms). 
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defined. It has often been held that what might constitute waste, as 
applied to a piece of land in one place, might not, when applied to 
another, in a different place.121 The American system, and 
consequently weak sustainability, functions much better on a local 
scale because the necessary assumption of complete fungibility of 
capital resources with low transaction costs falls apart as the market it 
describes becomes larger and more complex. 
Weak sustainability theory, like the American doctrine of waste, 
must recognize that there is some extreme lower boundary of natural 
capital that must be preserved, regardless of the effect depletion of 
that resource would have on net overall capital stock. Ever since the 
landmark case of Jackson v. Brownson, American courts have held 
that a tenant cannot fully deplete a natural resource and, instead, 
require that the tenant should preserve so much of the resource as is 
indispensably necessary to keep structures on the land in proper 
repair.122 A similar qualifier added on to the principle of weak 
sustainability would forbid the current generation from completely 
disregarding climate change and recklessly spewing massive 
quantities of carbon into the atmosphere. It would not matter if the 
technology produced as a result would be infinitely economically 
valuable to the next generation if the atmosphere were so depleted 
that they could not live and breathe freely. Unfortunately, weak 
sustainability seems not to acknowledge such a backstop level of 
natural capital, which is a significant and dangerous flaw. 
The arguments of those who defended the American change to the 
ancient doctrine of waste are almost indistinguishable from those of 
modern advocates who support weak sustainability. It had been said 
that if the English version of the waste doctrine were universally 
adopted in this country, it would greatly impede the progress of 
improvement without any compensating benefit. In order to achieve a 
net benefit to society, it was argued, the rules of law must be 
accommodated to the situation of the new country.123 These are the 
very same arguments used by developing countries today in an 
	
121 Keeler v. Eastman, 11 Vt. 293, 295 (1839); Paris v. Vasconcellos et al., 14 Haw. 
590, 594 (1903) (“Whatever the definition given by each, all the authorities seem to agree 
that the law of waste accommodates itself to the varying wants, conditions and usages of 
different countries, and that there is no absolute rule as to what shall constitute waste 
under all circumstances . . . .”). 
122 See Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns. 227,233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810). 
123 See Winship v. Pitts, 3 Paige Ch. 259 (N.Y. Ch. 1832). 
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attempt to shirk any kind of commitment to climate change 
mitigation. But policymakers in the United States rely on strains of 
this reasoning as well. In an environmental policy regime that now 
has cost-benefit analysis as a core component of almost every 
decision, the economic growth (increase in man-made capital) versus 
environmental degradation (decrease in natural capital) is an all-too-
familiar and all-too-comfortable tradeoff. 
B. The English Doctrine and Strong Sustainability 
In England, the doctrine of waste operated to preserve specific 
resources on a particular estate rather than the overall value of said 
estate. This is in direct contrast to the American doctrine and the 
concept of weak sustainability described above. To determine if a 
tenant’s action constituted waste in England, the test was simply 
whether said action changed the nature of the property, and courts 
established rather lengthy lists of activities that were per se 
prohibited, such as converting arable land into wood, or a meadow 
into plough or pasture land.124 Particularly apropos to the modern 
sustainability discussion, courts deemed mining for coal as waste 
where the mines were not open when the tenant came in.125 
As the test and examples illustrate, the English iteration of the 
waste doctrine aligns theoretically with the concept of strong 
sustainability. Strong sustainability requires leaving the subsequent 
generation a stock of critical natural capital not smaller than the one 
enjoyed by the present generation.126 At its core, strong sustainability 
is essentially a “non-substitutability paradigm,”127 which is best 
described as the idea that there are certain functions that the 
environment performs that cannot be duplicated by humans. The 
ozone layer, for example, is an ecosystem service that would be 
extremely difficult for humans to duplicate. The central idea of 
preserving natural capital is precisely the same as the one motivating 
much of the age-old common law of waste in England. Actions were 
classified as waste (now unsustainable) if, when the subsequent 
	
124 Maleverer v. Spinke, (1537) 73 Eng. Rep. 79 (K.B.) 82 (holding that the tenant 
“cannot convert land into wood, or wood into arable land, or convert meadow into arable 
land, and if he do it is waste”); see also COKE, supra note 50, at 53a–b (providing a more 
complete list of offenses that constituted waste). 
125 COKE, supra note 50, at 53b. 
126 Gutés, supra note 13, at 147. 
127 NEUMAYER, supra note 105, at 1–2. 
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possessor in interest took ownership, the fundamental natural 
resources of the land were no longer available to him. 
In contrast to the American doctrine of waste and weak 
sustainability theory, the question posed by the English courts and the 
strong sustainability advocates is not primarily economic, but rather 
ecological. The focus is on determining the fundamental nature of the 
estate and assessing the impact of specific actions on the continuing 
existence of said nature for succeeding generations. With respect to 
the big picture of climate change, this requires maintaining a level of 
emissions that will not result in continuously increasing global 
temperatures, which are already decimating, and will continue to 
decimate, irreplaceable natural capital stocks. This analysis further 
requires classifying resources as renewable and non-renewable, as 
well as determining the rates at which renewable resources replenish. 
Persisting in activity that significantly contributes to, rather than 
mitigates, global warming and/or measurably depletes nonrenewable 
resources would constitute waste and be unsustainable under the 
strong model. 
Just like with the application of the American test for waste to 
modern sustainability issues, much depends on the scale of the 
analysis even when using the English test as a proxy for strong 
sustainability. Although the difficulty with regards to economic 
calculation of man-made capital gain against natural capital loss falls 
off when using the strong sustainability model, the problem of having 
no instrument to define the scope of the property interests persists, as 
one still must assess the depletion of natural resources and determine 
sustainable levels of utilization. Adopting a model of strong 
sustainability need not require shifting to a steady-state, stationary 
economy, but rather only changing economic resource allocations 
over time at levels which will not alter the overall ecosystem beyond 
the point where the stability (resilience) of the system is threatened.128 
The English doctrine and strong sustainability theory would forbid 
many climate change-inducing activities that would be potentially 
permissible under the American doctrine of waste and weak 
sustainability on most, if not all, scales of analysis. The extensive 
mining and use of fossil fuels presents an example of a situation 
where the theories diverge. If current levels of mining and resource 
depletion persist, future generations will be deprived of the access to 
	
128 TURNER, supra note18, at 14–15. 
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those natural resources and the landscape that had to be decimated to 
harvest them. Under the stricter strong sustainability test, it matters 
not what was produced using the depleted resources, but rather what 
makes the activity unsustainable is the fact that it so changes the earth 
that future generations will not have any real ability to utilize certain 
types of natural resources for themselves. In the words of the English 
waste doctrine, the nature of the estate that the future generations 
inherit will be fundamentally different. This stricter test provides a 
similarly clear answer with respect to activities that cause sea-level 
rise and loss of permafrost at the levels discussed in the previous 
section.129 By persisting in these activities, the current generation is 
altering the land so significantly that it will be completely 
unavailable, or at the very least uninhabitable, to future generations. 
Experience of the English courts with regards to waste teaches us 
that an obligation exists in the equitable sense even if it cannot be 
established at law, and even if the first generation harmed is not the 
immediately subsequent one. The party entitled to maintain the old 
common law action of waste was the person who held the immediate 
estate of inheritance in remainder or reversion, but courts of equity 
found grounds to interpose when there was an intermediate estate, and 
consequently there was no such remedy at law.130 Although one need 
not go so far as to demand a court judgment with regards to climate 
harms, a similar equitable situation has arisen with regards to 
damaging the future interest holders. All of this is to say that strong 
sustainability theory and the English doctrine of waste establish a firm 
duty on the part of the current generation to mitigate the effects of 
climate change by reducing emissions and other contributions to it 
immediately. 
C. Why Sensible Policy Must Acknowledge Some Notion of Critical 
Natural Capital 
It is certainly the case that many advocates remain on both sides of 
the philosophical Atlantic with regards to the sustainability debate. 
Weak sustainability is championed by many an economist and those 
who have unbridled faith in the power of technology and human 
ingenuity. However, the history of the waste doctrine in the United 
States and England demonstrates that it is unwise to deny the 
	
129 See supra Part IV.A. 
130 Perrot v. Perrot, (1744), 26 Eng. Rep. 857; Vane v. Barnard, (1716), 23 Eng. Rep. 
1082; Dennett v. Dennett, 43 N.H. 499, 501–02 (1862). 
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existence of non-substitutable natural capital. This is evidenced by a 
United States waste case that, in addition to providing the most 
applicable precedent for climate change harms, also acknowledges 
that some level of natural capital must be maintained, even when 
applying a strictly economic model for waste (or sustainability). 
In the 1841 court of errors case of Livingston v. Reynolds,131 the 
object of the bill was to obtain an injunction against future waste,132 
which is precisely what many policymakers wish to do with respect to 
capping carbon emissions moving forward. The court held that: 
the claim of such a right, and the threat of exercising it, were of 
themselves, even without any overt act, sufficient to constitute a 
case of equitable cognizance; but when the sincerity of such claim 
of right, and the good will of such threat of its exercise were 
verified by aggravated acts of waste already committed, these were 
quite sufficient, not merely to justify, but to require the prompt and 
effective interference of equity.133 
The court further held that the test of waste is not injury, but 
dishersion of the remainderman; the actions contested therein 
constituted waste because the tenant had destroyed timber, which he 
could not reproduce, and had carried off the demised premises soil, 
which he could not restore.134 
The court took into account the substitutability of the resources 
depleted by the tenant in making its waste calculation. The holding 
suggests that complete depletion of such non-substitutable resources 
is an incalculable injury that cannot be offset. Policymakers, when 
considering whether and how to mitigate global warming, should 
similarly acknowledge that the aforementioned effects of continued 
high levels of greenhouse gas emissions are irreparable, and the value 
of the continued availability of a menu of natural resources is also at 
present incalculable. This simple acknowledgement would be a 
substantial commitment to maintain some baseline level of natural 
capital and not adopt a weak sustainability platform. 
In addition to the waste doctrine case law, one prime example of 
weak sustainability actually effectuated in policy cautions strongly 
against taking such a course again. The government of the Pacific 
island of Nauru permitted increased heavy phosphate mining in order 
	
131 Livingston v. Reynolds, 26 Wend. 115 (N.Y. 1841). 
132 Id. at 123. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 122. 
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to bring businesses and jobs to the small island, but, in the process, 
has almost completely destroyed the island’s natural environment. As 
a result, the inhabitants can afford a high standard of living from the 
interests of their accumulated capital; however, the quality of life has 
not increased. In fact, many people suffer from poor health and the 
life expectancy of male citizens is decreasing.135 The results on Nauru 
provide a much-needed experimental microcosm of how global well-
being might be impacted by a policy of weak sustainability. 
Fortunately, things may be headed down a more sensible path. It 
has been reported that a significant number of economists worldwide 
now accept that a minimum stock of natural capital is critical for 
human survival and well-being.136 If economists, who were once the 
staunchest advocates of weak sustainability, can be convinced that 
some level of natural capital must be preserved for future generations, 
then policy may inch closer towards the strong sustainability end of 
the spectrum. 
V 
THE JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF WASTE AS A THEORETICAL LENS 
A. Why a Class Action on Behalf of Future Generations Should Not 
Yet Be the Preferred Tool 
Despite the reliance on a common law doctrine, the aim of this 
work is not necessarily to convince the reader that the courts are the 
proper venue for determining the course of sustainability policy. 
Though the merits of a class action waste claim on behalf of future 
generations would indeed be compelling, and a state court could 
conceivably adjudicate such a case, the barriers to such adjudication 
and the impracticalities those barriers illuminate counsel against such 
a course of action. Despite this, the policy debate still stands to 
benefit from the years of judicial reasoning and the common law 
waste doctrine tests surveyed in this work. Though the problem of 
sustainability is a relatively modern conundrum for policymakers, 
intergenerational resource allocation has long been a question the 
courts have tackled through the application of the waste doctrine, and 
their learned wisdom should not fall on deaf ears. 
The primary reason that a cause of action based on the waste 
doctrine should not be the preferred method for imposing 
	
135 Konrad Ott, supra note 14, at 63. 
136 Id. 
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intergenerational obligations is that the waste doctrine operates on an 
individual rather than collective scale. The waste doctrine was 
originally conceived to negotiate the interests of succeeding parties on 
one particular piece of property rather than the aggregated interests of 
a social class or generation. The doctrine, in fact, has a corollary that 
operates on a larger scale. Under the public trust doctrine, citizen 
groups have long had the right to bring claims of waste with regards 
to lands held in public trust.137 The case of Marks v. Whitney settled 
this question, holding that any member of the public has standing to 
bring suit on behalf of a class of fellow citizens with regards to lands 
held in public trust.138 In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 
the Supreme Court of California recognized the affirmative duty of 
the state to plan and allocate the limited resources in a public trust for 
the benefit of all citizens.139 A climate change suit on behalf of a 
future generation class would much more closely resemble these 
public trust suits than a traditional landlord-tenant waste dispute. This 
strategy is in fact already being pursued by some of the most 
progressive environmental lawyers.140 
Related to the issue of scale is the fact that any climate waste case 
of an impactful size would require a court to recognize property 
interests that do not necessarily comport with written instruments. As 
mentioned above, to operate on claims between intergenerational 
classes, the waste doctrine must treat the present generation, 
regardless of their individual interests in estates, as life tenants and 
the future generations as the remaindermen. The court would have to 
acknowledge that the formal interests created by conveyances are 
merely symbolic and strive to serve a more sophisticated goal of 
rights allocation. Though there are compelling arguments for adopting 
this position in the policymaking context, as defining the interests in 
this way is quite logical and descriptive of reality,141 it would at 
present be impossibly difficult to persuade a court of law to adopt 
such a drastic approach. 
	
137 See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., supra note 92, at 460–61 for a discussion of public trusts 
and public rights in the context of water resources. 
138 Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 381–82 (Cal. 1971). 
139 See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983). 
140 See Wood & O’Toole, supra note 104, at 1–2 (advocating for such an approach to 
be taken); see also Legal Action, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, http://ourchildrenstrust.org 
/Legal (last visited Feb. 26, 2013) (detailing atmospheric trust litigation). 
141 See supra Part II. 
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In addition to a new conception of property interests, any court 
adjudicating a claim premised on the waste doctrine would have to 
afford standing to a class of future persons, some, if not all, of whom 
are not yet even living. Although there is precedent for adjudicating 
the rights of future generations in international courts,142 no domestic 
court has yet to expand standing doctrine in this way. Until at least 
one jurisdiction affirmatively adopts Christopher Stone’s approach to 
appointing guardians in contexts outside of incapacity, such as for the 
representation of natural entities themselves (trees, wildlife, etc.), 
bringing suit on behalf of future generations in any context will be an 
uphill battle.143 The public trust doctrine approach avoids this novel 
area of standing doctrine because unborn future generations are not 
the only trustees. For this reason, from a litigation-strategy, rather 
than policy-analysis standpoint, the waste doctrine should at present 
remain disfavored. 
Furthermore, although it is true that state common law courts have 
not developed a uniform political question doctrine resembling the 
rule that exists in the federal system, there is some parallelism in 
refusing to adjudicate certain political issues.144 The political question 
doctrine has provided the basis for the notable dismissals of climate 
change tort and nuisance actions in federal courts and could likely do 
the same for a climate waste case.145 Most recently, the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California relied on the 
political question doctrine to dismiss the claims of the Native Village 
of Kivalina, Alaska, against the ExxonMobil Corporation and 
others,146 which alleged that the defendants’ contribution to global 
warming constituted public and private nuisance, conspiracy, and 
	
142 See Minors Oposa v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Env’t and Natural Res., 33 I.L.M. 173, 
185 (Phil. High Ct. 1994) (finding that forty-two children and their legal guardians had 
“personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations”). 
143 See generally Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal 
Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972). See also Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741–44 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
144 See Nat Stern, The Political Question Doctrine in State Courts, 35 S.C. L. REV. 405, 
407 (1984). “[S]tate courts have avoided dictating to the executive and legislative branches 
how government should be structured and how decisions should be made.” Id. at 412. 
145 Contra Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (affirming, by 
an equally divided Court, the Second Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction, which overturned 
the Southern District of New York’s holding that public nuisance actions against utilities 
“present non-justiciable political questions that are consigned to the political branches, not 
the Judiciary.” 406 F. Supp. 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). 
146 See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 871–77 
(N.D. Cal. 2009). 
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concerted action causing harm to their village.147 The court ultimately 
dismissed the claim, on political question analysis, for lack of 
judicially manageable standards148 and the requirement of an initial 
important policy decision.149 Although standards of the waste 
doctrine, like the ones proposed herein, are arguably judicially 
manageable, there has still not been an initial policy determination by 
the legislative or executive branches, which leaves open the distinct 
possibility that a court would not extend common law doctrine into 
what is arguably the province of the legislature on the basis of 
separation of powers doctrine. Indeed, it is in this much needed 
legislative and/or executive policy decision, rather than a potential 
lawsuit, that this work hopes to advance. 
B. How the Potential and Historical Choice of Remedy Informs the 
Policy Debate 
Even if issues of justiciability would bar courts from adjudicating a 
climate change waste doctrine claim, treating the current generation’s 
actions as a breach of its legal duty to not use the land in a way that 
interferes with the future generations’ interest remains extraordinarily 
useful in the policy sphere, allowing policymakers to frame the choice 
between policy instruments as a determination of the type of relief 
that should be granted. The two general forms of relief available in 
property law cases, injunction and money damages, implicate 
different considerations and correspond to opposite theories of 
sustainability. Like a judiciary deciding a potential waste case, 
policymakers have a difficult choice to make between these distinct 
options or some hybrid of the two. For this reason, insights from 
judicial preferences for one remedy or the other have the ability to 
provide sound reasoning for climate change policy preferences that is 
uniquely grounded in concrete historical disputes concerning 
intertemporal resource allocation. 
Injunctive relief would require imposing an absolute cap on 
emissions by the current generation, or members named as 
defendants, in a state. Justice concerns may require that the cap be 
	
147 Id. at 869. 
148 Id. at 873–76. 
149 Id. at 876–77. This concept, as famously articulated by Alexander Bickel, is the 
belief the courts should declare an issue non-justiciable because of its “sheer 
momentousness.” ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 184 (1962). 
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allocated so that one geographic area does not suffer 
disproportionately. Regardless of how it is divided, the cap would be 
absolute and the current generation would be enjoined from 
exceeding the cap. This option corresponds with direct command and 
control regulation and is in accord with the theory of strong 
sustainability. 
The more flexible option would dictate the payment of economic 
damages by the current generation, presumably through some type of 
escrow account, for any harm caused by their continued greenhouse 
gas emissions. Naturally, the amount of damages will be directly 
dependent on the amount of emissions in the past and the amount 
going forward. This option corresponds with a carbon tax or pollution 
penalty, and is in accord with the theory of weak sustainability. 
Practical difficulties exist with both general options for relief. An 
emissions cap could potentially stifle current production and 
profitability as well as require significant monitoring to ensure 
compliance. Courts are generally extremely hesitant to issue 
injunctions when they require extended and complicated oversight, 
and perhaps this should be a lesson to the regulatory regime. 
However, the doctrine of waste is one of the few common law 
doctrines that has historically commanded injunctive relief, 
particularly in England. Like any other equitable remedy, injunctions 
against waste required a showing that a remedy at law was not 
adequate. In this context, though, that showing was not particularly 
challenging because of the irreversible nature of most harms to real 
property. Irreversibility certainly describes many of the 
aforementioned harms resulting from climate change.150 The control 
afforded by the injunction approach is perhaps the only way to ensure 
that the nature of the future interest is appropriately preserved, which 
is the goal of strong sustainability. Returning to the English 
preference for preservation of the nature of estates in land without 
returning to the accompanying feudal social class structure, perhaps 
even on a nation-state-level scale, might be the biggest challenge of 
this approach from a legal theory perspective. 
Technology-forcing or emissions-capping regulations avoid the 
problem of environmental quality becoming commodified.151 
Policymakers can consider all factors, including the equitable rights 
of the parties to particular forms of natural capital, in setting the 
	
150 See supra Part IV. 
151 Id. 
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appropriate level of emissions to achieve partial or complete 
mitigation. Despite these advantages and this type of regulation’s 
current widespread use in the United States, critics point out that the 
necessary centralization makes the system inefficient.152 Also, in the 
case of property, there is legitimate concern about the control 
afforded to the unborn over the current generation’s liberty. 
Despite the strong historical precedent, many courts, particularly in 
the United States, have become increasingly fond of money damages 
awards in property law cases. Generally, monetary obligations are 
much simpler to administrate. This would also be true in the climate 
change regulatory context. However, the distribution of funds 
collected presents unique difficulties and requires more oversight than 
a typical transaction. Those who have argued for intergenerational 
transfers of this type frequently suggest a trust managed by a 
government-appointed trustee.153 Future persons could collect from 
the trust upon some type of showing that their inherited property has 
been damaged by climate change. Such a system requires oversight in 
appointing the trustee and in evaluating claims. Compensation funds 
of a similar sort are commonplace as a result of class action lawsuits, 
and so this solution could still impose less of an administrative burden 
than command and control injunctive relief. The larger problem with 
such a system is determining how to define the beneficiaries of such a 
trust because a broad conception of those aggrieved could make the 
group potentially indefinite. An option that avoids this difficulty but 
requires more administration in the short-term is putting the funds 
towards public mitigation and adaptation projects rather than 
distributing them to individual claimants. Regardless of the 
distribution option chosen, money damages may never be equivalent 
to the actual resources and land interests they are meant to 
compensate for. 
The preference for money damages in suits concerning harm to 
interests in real property grew, like the concept of weak sustainability, 
out of the law and economics movement.154 The absolute right of one 
	
152 See TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET 
ENVIRONMENTALISM 7–8 (rev. ed. 2001). 
153 See DOUGLAS KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE 148, 152–53 (2010). 
154 See Jeff L. Lewin, Compensated Injunctions and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 
IOWA L. REV. 775, 775–76 (1986) (noting that, in the analogous field of nuisance law, the 
twenty-five years preceding his article saw the emergence of an “entirely new approach      
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property interest-holder to essentially hold hostage an otherwise 
economically-efficient development project troubled the courts, 
especially during the mid-twentieth century period of growth and 
expansion in America. Damage awards in property law nuisance and 
waste cases allow a court to set the economically efficient price for 
continuing the harmful activity. This generally results in a judgment 
amount that reflects market value rather than the subjective value of 
the holder of the property interest. Such a result runs the risk of not 
adequately protecting the interest in land; in the case of environmental 
harm, any effects beyond those economically quantifiable, such as 
aesthetics, might go unprotected. On the other hand, the calibrated 
precision of this model removes the potential for unreasonable 
holdout by the future interest holder. 
Environmentalists and economists that subscribe to weak 
sustainability theory advocate for a shift to a corrective tax system to 
control pollution for the same reasons the courts came to prefer 
money damages awards. Such a system neatly translates 
intergenerational environmental harm into economic terms and 
incentivizes rather than compels mitigation, avoiding the much-
maligned problem of “unborn hand” control that comes with 
injunctive-type relief and frustrates the policy of free alienability of 
property. This more efficient approach would allow the polluters to 
decide whether it makes economic sense to reduce output or pay more 
to continue polluting.155 Environmentalists have also maintained that 
taxes may be the most effective control.156 However, significant 
challenges exist to adopting such an approach. Political pressure from 
environmentalists concerned with commodification, coupled with the 
stigma of taxation, makes it difficult for this policy to garner support 
from either political party. Also, if the penalties are not calibrated 
properly, which requires anticipating the future profits of thousands of 
corporations, overall capital may not even be preserved by such a 
system. 
The choice between these options will continue to be a difficult one 
both in property law and in climate change policy. Which interest 
should be given legal preference, present or future? A twentieth 
century trend in property law has carefully struck a balance between 
	
. . . in which land use conflicts are analyzed in economic terms, with an emphasis on the 
goal of efficiency in resource allocation”). 
155 ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 152. 
156 Id. 
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the two remedies that may serve as a useful illustration for the policy 
discussion. Beginning with the landmark case, Boomer v. Atlantic 
Cement, courts have begun to order injunctions that can be bought out 
for a pre-determined amount.157 An analogous scheme in the 
regulatory context would resemble the cap-and-trade system that 
many policymakers have advocated for. It acknowledges that some 
baseline level of natural capital must be preserved by imposing strict 
caps on total emissions, but then allows the creation and purchase of 
emissions credits, which are made available on a free market, to 
determine the local levels of emissions. Such a hybrid plan would 
help to ensure the economically efficient output of pollution by 
compelling firms to make sound investments in pollution reducing 
technology, but leaving them a potential way out if the costs of 
mitigation prove to be astronomical. Drawbacks obviously exist, and 
it is essential that the system be properly calibrated through an 
objective scientific analysis that is free of corruption. 
Setting aside the above middle position and considering the 
extremes described earlier of direct intervention a la injunctive relief 
versus economic incentives through taxation a la money damages, 
common law property jurisprudence could provide at least a rough 
guide for determining which end of the spectrum is preferable. If the 
legislature finds the economically-grounded reasoning of the courts in 
property law cases compelling and fears the subjective valuation of 
the next generation overly restricting this generation’s productivity, 
the clear policy fit would be the adoption of a weak sustainability 
definition and a tax or market-based solution to implement it. On the 
other hand, if legislators find the historical grounding of the waste 
doctrine in the preservation of specific natural capital resources more 
persuasive, strong sustainability becomes the brand of choice and a 
command and control regulatory option should be utilized. Assuming 
both political parties ultimately agree that something must be done 
about climate change, which is admittedly a bold assumption at this 
point, framing the choice of policy options at either end of the 
spectrum in property law terms could stir up productive conversation 
by creating internal conflict. Traditionally conservative property 
rights values, to the extent that they protect future interests, 
potentially clash with fiscally conservative preferences for 
deregulation and economically-calibrated solutions. Adding another 
	
157 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
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layer to this internal conflict, the conservative aversion to taxation 
clashes with the most economically sound policy option.158 Perhaps 
these internal conflicts simply bring to light the underlying reasons, 
besides a general animosity towards environmental regulation, that 
conservatives have been so reluctant to accept any climate change 
policy option. Even that seemingly small and cynical observation may 
provide the reframing necessary to debate the real underlying issues 
and move beyond the shallow posturing that has crippled policy 
discussions thus far. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Imagining a series of climate change suits based on the doctrine of 
waste may be more an exercise in theoretical postulation than a 
grounded suggestion for contemporary litigation. For this reason, this 
work instead sought out to productively use the ancient traditions of a 
storied doctrine and the philosophical underpinnings of ethical 
obligations to future generations to ground and inform the policy 
debate. If such an exercise does nothing else but provide a new lens 
and fresh language with which to change the framing of a now-stale 
political debate, it will have achieved its primary objective. 
Looking toward the application of this theory to the legislative 
debate, one could imagine an empirical study of property law 
remedies carefully examining trends and translating conclusions from 
that data into climate policy suggestions. This endeavor would be a 
productive undertaking for legal researchers in either body of the 
United States Congress. To that extent this work serves a prescriptive 
function with regards to the adoption of climate change policy that is 
it—to follow, or at least consider, the analogous trends in waste law, 
which have been developed over hundreds of years by learned judges 
and scholars divorced from the petty political debate of contemporary 
environmental policymaking. If nothing else, those trends point 
towards a formal recognition that there exists some non-substitutable 
natural capital that must be preserved. That core concept is part of our 
legal tradition, too. 
	
158 See What is the Taxpayer Protection Pledge?, AMERICANS FOR TAX REFORM, 
http://www.atr.org/taxpayer-protection-pledge (last visted Jan. 25, 2013) (a pledge to 
oppose any tax increases, currently signed by 236 members of the House of 
Representatives and 41 Senators). 
